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The impact of corporate tax avoidance on analyst coverage  
and forecasts 
 
Abstract Corporate tax avoidance is likely to be associated with a high level of earnings 
management and with high financial opacity in the time-series. On this basis, we hypothesize 
that analyst coverage is negatively associated with corporate tax avoidance. Our results 
confirm this conjecture, and are robust to using a firm-fixed-effects model and a quasi-natural 
experiment to control for potential endogeneity. Additional analysis shows that analyst 
coverage is negatively related to tax risk, but there is no evidence that the informativeness of, 
or errors in, analyst forecasts are associated with tax avoidance. Overall, our study advances 
understanding of the implications of corporate tax avoidance for analyst behavior. 
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1 Introduction 
Corporate tax avoidance practices are prevalent. Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) define tax 
avoidance in a broad sense as “the reduction of explicit taxes” (2010, p.137), and call for 
more research in this area. Prior studies (e.g. Lev and Nissim 2004; Weber 2009; Goh et al. 
2016) show that income tax expense contains information about the future earnings and 
economic performance of a firm. As such, tax-related information should affect financial 
analysts’ decision-making. However, little research attention to date has been paid to the 
impact of corporate tax avoidance on analysts’ judgements and decisions. The purpose of our 
study is to examine the impact of corporate tax avoidance on analyst coverage and forecasts; 
this should be a worthy goal for both academics and practitioners given the pivotal role 
analysts play as information intermediaries in stock markets.  
Earnings management, given its key role in shaping both managerial tax avoidance 
behavior and analyst behavior, is the crucial channel through which tax avoidance affects 
analyst coverage and forecasts. The prevailing literature (e.g. Erickson et al. 2004; Frank et al. 
2009; Desai and Dharmapala 2009; Lennox et al. 2013) documents that earnings management 
and associated financial opacity have an adverse impact on analyst decision-making, a view 
that is in line with intuition. However, it is unclear whether firms undertaking aggressive 
financial reporting are more, or less, aggressive in their tax planning (e.g., Bradshaw et al. 
2001; Elgers et al. 2003; Abarbanell and Lehavy 2003; Burgstahler and Eames 2003; Barth 
and Hutton 2004; Hodder et al. 2008; Salerno 2014).1 
 
1 In this study, the term, tax aggressiveness, is used synonymously with tax avoidance. 
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Indeed, the prior evidence on the association between corporate tax avoidance and 
earnings management is mixed. Some studies suggest a positive association between 
corporate tax avoidance and earnings management. For instance, Frank et al. (2009) show 
that corporate tax avoidance facilitates earnings management and increases the financial 
opacity of a firm. Other papers (e.g., Erickson et al. 2004; Lennox et al. 2013), however, find 
that tax-avoiding firms are less likely to pursue aggressive financial reporting. Managing 
concurrently book income upwards, and taxable income downwards, leads to a large book-tax 
difference, which can raise a “red flag” of financial misrepresentation or of tax avoidance to 
outsiders (e.g. Palepu et al. 2000; Hanlon 2005; Kuo and Lee 2016). Thus, in an attempt to 
avoid outsiders’ suspicions of accounting fraud or of tax avoidance, managers seek to 
increase corporate tax payments when inflating book income numbers, leading to a negative 
relation between tax avoidance and earnings management.  
In this paper, we argue that there is likely to be a positive time-series relation between 
corporate tax avoidance and earnings management, but that the contemporaneous association 
between the two in the cross-section is likely to be negative. We posit that firms tend to 
refrain from avoiding income taxes and manipulating earnings in the same fiscal period, 
because doing so increases book-tax differences, likely attracting scrutiny from tax 
authorities and other external stakeholders. However, managers could pursue earnings 
management in one period and tax avoidance in another. Such alternating use of tax 
avoidance and earnings management across different periods reduces the likelihood of being 
detected, thereby facilitating concealment of bad news and of managerial misbehavior. Were 
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managers to inflate earnings in the current period, suspicions of low earnings quality would 
arise from any subsequent downwards reversal of earnings. However, avoiding corporate 
taxes in the next period could mitigate this fall in earnings. Analyst earnings forecasts are 
normally based on the historical trend in firms’ financial information (e.g. Bradshaw et al. 
2014; Peek et al. 2016). Thus, in the presence of corporate tax avoidance, financial 
information used by analysts in forecasting will be more opaque. 
Prior studies (e.g. Lang and Lundholm 1996; Healy et al. 1999) document that firms 
with more information available or more informative disclosures have higher analyst 
coverage. The number of analysts following a firm depends critically on the net benefits of 
providing analyst services (Bhushan 1989). High financial opacity of a tax-avoiding firm 
increases the information acquisition and processing costs required of analysts in making 
unbiased earnings forecasts, thus dis-incentivizing analyst coverage. Furthermore, because of 
increased risks of inaccurate forecasts and associated reputation issues, analysts would be less 
likely to cover tax-avoiding firms that tend to have high financial opacity and more financial 
reporting errors. Therefore, we hypothesize that the level of analyst coverage is negatively 
correlated with the extent of corporate tax avoidance.  
In our empirical analysis, we construct two proxies for corporate tax avoidance: the 
long-run cash effective tax rate of Dyreng et al. (2008) and the residual domestic book-tax 
difference as per Desai and Dharmapala (2006). Our sample period covers the years of 1995- 
2014 with 29,372 firm-year observations. After controlling for a broad set of determinants of 
analyst coverage, we find economically and statistically significant results consistent with our 
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prediction that analyst coverage is negatively associated with corporate tax avoidance. This 
inference remains unchanged when we use a firm-fixed-effects regression model to control 
for potential correlated-omitted-variables bias.  
To better establish causality for the effect of corporate tax avoidance on analyst 
coverage, we follow Hasan et al. (2014) in conducting a quasi-natural experiment that is 
based on the enactment of Financial Accounting Standard Board Interpretation No.48 
(hereafter, FIN48) (FASB 2006). We assign firms that report tax reserves for uncertain tax 
benefits in the post-FIN48 period as treatment firms (which feature higher corporate tax 
avoidance), and firms that do not report any uncertain tax position in both the pre- and 
post-FIN48 periods as control firms (which feature little tax avoidance). In line with 
Blackwell et al. (2009) and Iacus et al. (2011), we employ a coarsened exact matching 
approach to match each treatment firm with a control firm for our natural experiment. Using 
a difference-in-differences research design, we find that analyst coverage is significantly 
lower for the treatment firms than for the control firms, thus corroborating the negative causal 
impact of corporate tax avoidance on analyst coverage.  
We also conduct additional tests to explore: (i) the impact of tax risk on analyst coverage, 
(ii) the impact of corporate tax avoidance on the informativeness of analyst earnings forecasts, 
and (iii) the impact of corporate tax avoidance on analyst forecast errors. First, to explore the 
impact of firm tax-position volatility on analyst behavior, we construct a measure of tax risk 
in terms of the standard deviation of a firm’s effective tax rates over the previous five years 
(e.g., Guenther et al. 2017; Drake et al. 2019). Financial opacity is higher for firms with more 
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volatile tax planning activities, making it more difficult for analysts to cover such firms. Thus, 
we expect a negative relationship between tax risk and analyst coverage. Our results confirm 
this. Second, following Frankel et al. (2006), we define the informativeness of analyst 
earnings forecasts as the magnitude of the stock price reaction to these forecasts. We find no 
evidence that corporate tax avoidance increases stock price reactions to analyst earnings 
forecasts, implying that corporate tax avoidance does not trigger higher investor demand for 
analyst services. One potential explanation is that investors are often unable to observe 
corporate tax avoidance and to understand its adverse impact on a firm’s financial 
transparency. Third, inter alia for reputation reasons, analysts often choose to cover firms for 
which they feel confident in making accurate forecasts (Das et al. 2006; Franco et al. 2015). 
For a tax-avoiding firm that analysts opt to cover, they might incur incrementally higher 
information gathering and/or processing costs to maintain forecast accuracy. As a result, 
notwithstanding the greater financial opacity that results from tax avoidance, actual analyst 
forecast errors may not increase. Consistent with this notion, we do not find evidence that 
corporate tax avoidance increases analyst forecast errors. 
This study makes several contributions. First, to the best of our knowledge, this paper is 
the first to examine the impact of corporate tax avoidance on analyst coverage and 
forecasting behavior. In particular, we show that corporate tax avoidance leads to lower 
analyst coverage but does not materially impact analyst earnings forecasting ability for 
covered firms.  
Importantly, we reconcile the mixed prior evidence on the relation between tax 
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avoidance and earnings management by arguing that the association between the two is 
negative in the cross-section but positive in the time-series. Because analysts rely on the 
historical trend in financial information in making their earnings forecasts (e.g. Bradshaw et 
al. 2014; Peek et al. 2016), corporate tax avoidance is likely to have an adverse impact on 
analyst coverage. Our results confirm this. Recent studies by Allen et al. (2016), Chen and 
Lin (2017), and Chen et al. (2018) examine the effects of analyst coverage on tax 
aggressiveness; our paper investigates a different research issue, i.e., the causal impact of 
corporate tax avoidance on analyst coverage. Our natural experiment design used to establish 
this causality relationship is in line with Hasan et al. (2014). 
Second, we complement the tax literature on the consequences of corporate tax 
avoidance. Prior studies (e.g. Chen et al. 2010; Graham et al. 2014; Menichini 2017; Cen et al. 
2017) document that the main benefit of corporate tax avoidance to a firm lies in the tax 
savings and associated increased cash flow. However, there are potential negative 
consequences to corporate tax avoidance, including reputational losses (Chen et al. 2010; 
Hanlon and Slemrod 2009), tax examination costs (Mills 1998; Mills and Newberry 2001), 
increased litigation risk (Graham and Tucker 2006), increased audit fees (Hanlon et al. 2012; 
Donohoe and Knechel 2014; Kuo and Lee 2016), substantive penalties imposed by tax 
authorities (Wilson 2009; Li et al. 2018), reduction in shareholder wealth due to managerial 
rent extractions (Desai and Dharmapala 2006, 2009), heightened stock price crash risk (Kim 
et al. 2011), and an increase in cost of capital (e.g. Hasan et al. 2014; Isin 2018). We extend 
this tax-consequences literature by showing that corporate tax avoidance also leads to a 
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decline in analyst coverage.  
Last, but not least, our study has practical implications. Specifically, managers’ alternate 
use of tax avoidance and earnings management can facilitate and mask their rent extraction, 
arguably leading to resource misallocation in financial markets. By showing that corporate 
tax avoidance has an adverse impact on firm coverage by financial analysts who are key 
information intermediaries, we flag concerns about potential reduced market efficiency. Our 
findings should thus be of interest to, among other parties, shareholders in their monitoring of 
managerial opportunism, and regulators and tax authorities seeking to better regulate 
corporate taxation and associated disclosure policies. One way to curb managers’ tax 
avoidance activities, as suggested by Kuo and Lee (2016), is to increase the conformity 
between book and taxable income measures.  
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 develops our hypothesis. 
Section 3 describes our sample and research design. Section 4 discusses our empirical results. 
Section 5 carries out additional analyses, and Section 6 concludes. 
 
2 Hypothesis development 
Analysts play an important role in capital markets: they provide forecasts and stock 
recommendations to investors to aid their investment decisions (Marcus and Wallace 1991; 
Lin et al. 2018; Aggarwal et al. 2018). In this paper, we explore the consequences of 
corporate tax avoidance on analyst behavior. Our main thesis is that corporate tax avoidance 
leads to reduced information transparency and to greater difficulty in forecasting earnings, 
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thus reducing analyst incentives to follow firms. Despite an extensive literature on corporate 
tax avoidance, its impact on analyst coverage has not been explored in the literature. In this 
section, we derive our main hypothesis and discuss related issues.  
2.1  Corporate tax avoidance and information opacity 
Extant academic research documents that corporate tax aggressiveness reduces the quality of 
the information environment of firms, rendering corporate information more opaque. For 
example, corporate tax avoidance involves complex tax transactions and thus can be used to 
hoard bad news associated with managerial rent extraction, leading to such rent extraction 
going undetected for extended periods (Desai and Dharmapala 2006, 2009; Kim et al. 2011). 
Comprix et al. (2011) show that large book-tax differences, which proxy for corporate tax 
avoidance, are associated with greater uncertainty about a firm’s fundamentals, and with an 
increased difference in opinion among investors. Hope et al. (2013) find that corporate tax 
avoidance is associated with fewer disclosures of geographic earnings by U.S. multinational 
firms, leading to reduced earnings informativeness (Hope et al. 2009). By and large, the 
empirical evidence illustrates the adverse impact of tax avoidance on corporate information 
transparency, with potential implications for analyst behavior.  
 
2.2  Corporate tax avoidance and earnings management 
Earnings management adversely affects the quality of analysts’ earnings forecasts. Although 
extant research examines the relation between corporate tax avoidance and earnings 
management, the results are mixed. Some researchers argue that tax avoidance is 
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accompanied by earnings manipulation. For example, Frank et al. (2009) document a positive 
association between aggressive tax reporting and aggressive financial reporting, suggesting 
that managers tend to make financial and tax decisions in a way that boosts financial 
reporting income and reduces taxable income. Similarly, Desai and Dharmapala (2006, 2009) 
show that managers reduce taxable income and inflate earnings in the dual-reporting setting. 
On the other hand, other studies document that corporate tax avoidance is negatively related 
to earnings management. For example, Lennox et al. (2013) predict, and find, that tax- 
aggressive firms are less likely to engage in fraudulent financial reporting. Erickson et al. 
(2004) find that firms committing accounting fraud pay more taxes on their fraudulently 
reported earnings, which suggests that firms regard the benefits from inflating earnings as 
outstripping the additional tax costs incurred. 
In the face of the conflicting evidence on the association between corporate tax 
avoidance and earnings management, we contend that the lead-lag association between tax 
avoidance and earnings management is likely positive in the time-series, but that the 
contemporaneous relation between the two is likely negative in the cross-section. We 
postulate that managers are less likely to engage in aggressive tax planning and earnings 
management simultaneously, because any conspicuous increased book-tax difference 
resulting would likely cause outsiders to suspect that the managers have either inflated 
earnings or avoided income taxes.  
Instead, managers may manipulate earnings in one period, and avoid corporate income 
taxes in another, so that book-tax differences will not appear significantly increased, as 
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compared with implementing tax avoidance policies and earnings management in the same 
fiscal period. On the one hand, earnings inflation might be preceded by tax avoidance in 
managerial strategies designed to disguise bad news associated with rent extraction (Desai 
and Dharmapala 2006, 2009). Though tax avoidance can be used as a tool to conceal bad 
news (Kim et al. 2011), it is hard for managers to iterate tax avoidance in consecutive years 
without being detected by the tax authorities. So, in an attempt to hoard bad news over an 
extended period, managers may pursue tax avoidance in a particular year, and alternate this 
with upwards earnings management in the following year. On the other hand, tax avoidance 
could in turn follow earnings inflation to window-dress firm performance. Earnings inflated 
in one period are likely to attract suspicion by outsiders once the inflated earnings reverse in 
the subsequent year; however, an increase in cash flow due to tax avoidance activities can 
help mitigate the adverse effects of such earnings reversals.   
All in all, the alternating use of tax avoidance and earnings management strategies 
across different years could serve to distract the attention and vigilance of outsiders, thereby 
allowing managers to take advantage of self-serving opportunities. Such a covert strategy 
would render corporate information more opaque and less understandable in the time-series. 
Analysts form their earnings forecasts based on the trend in a firm’s financial figures over 
several years rather than on the firm’s financial report for a particular year (e.g. Bradshaw et 
al. 2014; Peek et al. 2016). Therefore, corporate tax avoidance will serve to obfuscate the 
financial information used by analysts in their earnings forecasts, making accurate 
forecasting more difficult, and potentially leading to analysts’ reluctance to follow such 
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tax-aggressive firms.  
 
2.3  The effect of corporate tax avoidance on analyst coverage 
The fundamental drivers of analyst coverage are the supply of, and demand for, analyst 
services (Bhushan 1989; Frankel et al. 2006). From the “supply-curve” perspective, the 
supply of analyst services depends on the information acquisition and processing costs 
analysts incur in providing their forecast services. Research suggests that analysts tend to 
follow more transparent firms, since these firms are less costly to follow (Chang et al. 2006; 
Yu 2008; Irani and Oesch 2013). For instance, Yu (2008) shows that earnings management 
activities reduce analyst coverage as analysts need to exert more effort, and incur more costs, 
in penetrating the resulting more opaque financial disclosures.  
Forecast accuracy is an important determinant of an analyst’s compensation and career 
prospects (Stickel 1992; Mikhail et al. 1999; Hong and Kubik 2003; Ke and Yu 2006; Emery 
and Li 2009; Wu and Zang 2009; Brown et al. 2015; Roger 2018). For example, Stickel 
(1992) shows that earnings forecast accuracy is viewed as an important indicator of analyst 
ability, and that “All-Star” analysts who make more accurate earnings forecasts are paid more 
than their peers. Mikhail et al. (1999) find that the probability of analyst turnover increases 
for those analysts with lower forecast accuracy relative to their peers that follow the same 
firm. Therefore, analysts have an incentive to make more accurate forecasts.  
Corporate tax avoidance not only makes financial information itself more opaque, as 
documented in prior research (e.g. Desai and Dharmapala 2006; Graham and Tucker 2006; 
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Kim et al. 2011; Hope et al. 2013; Crabtree and Kubick 2014), but also is likely associated 
with a higher level of earnings management activities in the time-series, as discussed in the 
previous section. As a result, ceteris paribus, it becomes more difficult for analysts to make 
accurate forecasts. Put differently, to maintain forecast accuracy for a tax-aggressive firm, 
analysts have to incur higher information gathering and/or processing costs, thereby reducing 
their incentive to follow the firm. If, on the other hand, analysts are not prepared to incur the 
increased costs for a tax-aggressive firm, their forecasts will be less accurate, harming their 
reputation as well as compensation and career prospects. Therefore, more tax-aggressive 
firms are less attractive to financial analysts. The main hypothesis of our paper based on the 
supply-curve argument follows:  
H1: Analyst coverage is negatively associated with corporate tax avoidance. 
On the other hand, when a firm’s financial information becomes more opaque as a result 
of its tax avoidance activities, there is likely to be an increased investor demand for analyst 
services, which should in turn lead to greater analyst coverage. This “demand-curve” 
argument, however, is based on the assumption that investors are able to observe corporate 
tax avoidance and to understand its adverse impact on a firm’s financial transparency. Such 
an assumption does not necessarily hold. Investors, who are generally constrained in their 
information processing abilities and do not have access to private information, are usually 
unable to observe complex tax avoidance transactions; high information opacity resulting 
from corporate tax avoidance is often difficult to see through in the absence of necessary 
information provision and appropriate professional expertise. In addition, analysts might not 
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be sufficiently sophisticated to appreciate the implications of corporate tax avoidance for 
future earnings. Therefore, the demand-curve argument, which posits that corporate tax 
avoidance will trigger higher investor demand for analyst services, is intuitively less 
persuasive. We also test and refute this argument in Section 5.2.2 Nonetheless, we employ 
the supply-curve argument to establish H1 as intuitively more plausible.  
 
3 Sample and research design 
In this section, we describe our data sample, variables, and research design. 
3.1  Data sources and sample 
Because the release dates of analyst forecasts are not accurately represented in the I/B/E/S 
detail file prior to 1995 (Frankel et al. 2006; Clement et al. 2011), our sample period begins 
in that year; it ends in 2014. As with prior research (e.g., Frankel et al. 2006; Cheng and 
Subramanyam 2008; Batta et al. 2016; Jin et al. 2016), we focus on firm coverage and 
forecasts by sell-side analysts. Data on the analyst coverage and forecasts are obtained from 
I/B/E/S. Data on institutional holdings are collected from Factset. Other data are taken from 
CRSP and Compustat. We require that firm-year observations have necessary data available 
on CRSP, Compustat, I/B/E/S, and Factset to construct the variables of interest for our 
empirical tests. Our final sample used for testing the impact of corporate tax avoidance on 
analyst coverage consists of 29,372 firm-year observations for 7,285 unique firms.  
 
 
2 In fact, in contrast to our strong evidence consistent with the supply-curve argument, Section 5.2 finds 
no empirical support for the demand-curve argument. 
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3.2  Measures of corporate tax avoidance 
We use two corporate tax avoidance measures in our main tests. The first is the long-run 
effective tax rate (lretr) as per Dyreng et al. (2008). This is computed as the sum of corporate 
income tax paid, divided by the sum of a firm’s pre-tax income net of special items, over the 
previous five years. High lretr indicates low corporate tax avoidance. It is hard for managers 
to avoid corporate income taxes in successive years without being detected. Hence, volatile 
tax positions are likely to reflect managers’ tax planning strategies. Use of a one-year 
effective tax rate to measure the extent of corporate tax avoidance inevitably involves 
measurement errors. The long-run effective tax rate gets around this measurement issue. Also, 
the use of this long-term measure fits well with our conceptual argument that managers are 
likely to use earnings management and tax avoidance alternately in different years for 
opportunistic purposes.  
Our second tax avoidance measure is the residual domestic book-tax difference 
(ddmpbtd) of Desai and Dharmapala (2006), which is calculated as the residual, 𝜀𝑖,𝑡, of the 
following firm-fixed-effects regression model: 
, 1 , ,i t i t i i tmpbtd ta u = + +                          (1) 
where mpbtd is the Manzon and Plesko (2002) book-tax difference. In calculating mpbtd, we 
follow Cheng et al. (2012) in excluding foreign tax expense from the total current tax 
expense. ta is total accruals calculated as per Hribar and Collins (2002). ui represents 
firm-fixed effects which control for the effect of unobserved firm characteristics on mpbtd. A 
large book-tax difference could result from either upwards earnings management or corporate 
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tax avoidance (Kuo and Lee 2016). The Desai and Dharmapala (2006) measure purges the 
book-tax difference attributed to earnings management activities, and thus is more powerful 
than the Manzon and Plesko (2002) book-tax difference (mpbtd) in capturing the extent of 
corporate tax avoidance. High ddmpbtd indicates a high level of corporate tax avoidance.  
 
3.3  Multivariate tests of H1 
To test the effect of corporate tax avoidance on analyst coverage, we start by using the 
following pooled OLS regression model: 
, 0 1 , , , ,( )
k
i t i t i t i k i i t
k
lanacov lretr ddmpbtd controls YearDummies   = + + + +     (2) 
where lanacov is analyst coverage, calculated as the natural logarithm of one plus the number 
of analysts that make at least one annual EPS forecast for a firm in a fiscal year. lanacov is 
equal to 0 if there is no analyst forecasting annual EPS for the firm in a particular year. 
ddmpbtd and lretr are defined as previously. Because a high (low) value of ddmpbtd (lretr) 
represents a high level of corporate tax avoidance, we expect that if the coefficient on 
ddmpbtd (lretr) has a negative (positive) sign and is statistically significant, then our results 
support H1.  
Model (2) also includes a wide range of control variables that prior literature finds to be 
associated with analyst coverage. Bhushan (1989) claims that larger firms are more attractive 
to outside investors, spurring the demand for analyst services for these firms, and leading to 
greater analyst following. Thus, we control for firm size (size) and predict it to be positively 
correlated with analyst coverage. Brokerage houses are likely to encourage their analysts to 
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cover more actively traded firms (Frankel et al. 2006), hence we include trading volume 
(tradingvol) as a control variable, and predict its positive relation with analyst coverage.  
We control for three proxies for firm-specific uncertainty: equity beta (beta), return 
volatility (retvol), and earnings volatility (stdeps), which should be positively associated with 
investor demand for analyst services and thus with increased analyst coverage (Bhushan 
1989). On the other hand, analysts might have weak incentives to follow firms that have high 
stock price or high abnormal stock returns (Brennan and Hughes 1991), because such firms 
might underperform in subsequent periods. Thus, we also control for stock price (price) and 
abnormal stock returns (qtrret) in our model, and expect these two variables to be negatively 
related to analyst coverage.  
Analysts prefer to cover highly-profitable and financially-healthy firms (e.g. Das et al. 
2006; Lee and So 2017). Thus, we control for pre-tax return on assets (roa) and financial 
constraints (hp).3 The higher (lower) a firm’s pre-tax return on assets is (financial constraints 
are), the more likely analysts are to follow the firm. We also control for institutional 
ownership (insti), but the direction of the effect of institutional ownership on analyst 
coverage is ambiguous. If institutions rely on analyst reports to make their trading decisions 
and to fulfil their fiduciary responsibilities, greater institutional stock-holding should induce 
more analyst following (O’Brien and Bhushan 1990). Nonetheless, institutions are arguably 
sophisticated investors who are able to predict future firm performance and stock returns 
(Gompers and Metrick 2001; Cohen et al. 2002; Yan and Zhang 2009). In addition, 
 
3 All our multivariate results hold if we drop all firm-year observations with negative pre-tax earnings. 
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institutions also serve a monitoring role (Chen et al. 2007), prompting firms to disclose more 
relevant information to the public (Healy et al. 1999; Ajinkya et al. 2005), and thereby 
reducing investor demand for analyst services. As such, analysts might be less inclined to 
cover a firm with high institutional ownership.  
Prior studies (e.g. Lang and Lundholm 1996; Chang et al. 2006; He et al. 2019) provide 
evidence that analyst coverage is related to information asymmetry. Therefore, we include in 
our regression model research and development expenditures (rd), intangible assets 
(intangible), and book-to-market ratio (btm), which are used in prior literature as proxies for 
information asymmetry. Firms that have higher research and development expenditures, more 
intangible assets, or lower book-to-market ratios are likely to have greater information 
asymmetry with outsiders (Smith and Watts 1992; Aboody and Lev 2000; Gu and Wang 2005; 
Huddart and Ke 2007), and are thus expected to be followed by fewer analysts. 
We also consider the impact of Regulation Fair Disclosure (FD), which prohibits firms 
from selectively releasing private information to analysts. Absent private information from 
management, analysts have to incur higher information acquisition and/or processing costs to 
maintain forecast accuracy, and as a result, they might be less willing to cover firms (Irani 
and Karamanou 2003; Mohanram and Sunder 2006; Chen et al. 2016). We therefore use an 
indicator variable for the post-FD period (fd) in our regression. Finally, as analysts prefer to 
follow firms that are in more regulated industries (O’Brien and Bhushan 1990), we include an 
indicator variable for industrial regulatory status (regulated). All our control variables are 
defined in detail in the appendix. While including year dummies in the regression to control 
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for potential time effects, we cluster the standard errors of our regression coefficients by both 
firm and year to control for possible correlations of residuals within firms and years (Gow et 
al. 2010; Thompson 2011).  
Although we include an extensive list of control variables in the regression, we cannot 
completely exclude the possibility that our regression model still omits some variables that 
might be related to both corporate tax avoidance and analyst coverage. To address this 
concern, we re-estimate model (2) using the firm-fixed-effects regression technique, which 
holds unobserved firm characteristics constant and thereby alleviates endogeneity attributed 
to potentially omitted variables (e.g., Wooldridge 2016).  
 
3.4  Control for endogeneity – A quasi-natural experiment (FIN48) 
To strengthen our inferences and explore in more detail the causal relationship between 
corporate tax avoidance and analyst coverage, we also conduct a quasi-natural experiment. 
Recent tax research (e.g. Robinson and Schimidt 2013; Brown et al. 2016; Gupta et al. 2016) 
considers an alternative measure of corporate tax avoidance, namely, unrecognized tax 
benefits (hereafter, UTB). UTB stands for tax reserves for uncertain tax positions, which 
might or might not be sustained upon IRS audit. UTB can potentially capture corporate tax 
avoidance activities that might be opposed by tax authorities (e.g. Lisowsky et al. 2013). The 
Financial Accounting Standards Board Interpretation No.48 (i.e., FIN48) (FASB 2006), 
which relates to the appropriate accounting treatment for UTB, was implemented in June 
2006 and became effective from December 2006. Prior to FIN48, firms were reluctant to 
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disclose their UTB because it reflects their tax aggressiveness (Gleason and Mills 2002). 
Following FIN48, all firms are required to fully disclose their UTB, if any. As a result, any 
uncertain tax-position reserves set up by firms to avoid taxes before FIN48 are publicly 
disclosed after FIN48, creating information shock with respect to UTB. Furthermore, recent 
studies (e.g. Robinson et al. 2016; Robinson et al. 2017; Gleason et al. 2018) provide 
evidence that FIN48 lowers the informativeness and value relevance of corporate tax 
disclosures. Therefore, the promulgation of FIN48 provides a nice natural experiment to 
examine the causal impact of corporate tax avoidance on analyst following.  
Hasan et al. (2014) use FIN48 to conduct a natural experiment to examine the causal 
impact of corporate tax avoidance on the cost of bank loans. Following Hasan et al. (2014), 
we define a treatment firm as a firm that discloses UTB in any of the three years after FIN48, 
and a control firm as one that reports no uncertain tax position in both the pre- and 
post-FIN48 periods. Our natural experiment uses data for the three-year period 2003-2005 
before FIN48, and the three-year period 2007-2009 after FIN48. In line with H1, if analysts 
use the increased UTB-based disclosures, which result from the adoption of FIN48, to infer a 
firm’s tax avoidance, then the treatment firms should show a relative decline in analyst 
coverage after FIN48, compared with the control firms. To test this prediction, we employ the 
following difference-in-differences (DiD) regression model: 
, 0 1 2 3
, ,                
i t t i
k
i k i i t
k
lanacov yutb tutb utbinteract
controls YearDummies
   
 
= + + +
+ + +
                 (3) 
where the indicator variable yutb is used to indicate the pre- versus post-FIN48 periods for 
our sample: yutb equals to 1 (0) if a firm is in the years of 2007-2009 (2003-2005). We use 
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tutb=1 (tutb=0) to indicate a firm-year observation being in the treatment (control) group. 
utbinteract is the interaction term between yutb and tutb. The same set of control variables as 
in model (2), as well as year and industry dummies, are included in model (3) to perform our 
difference-in-differences test. We focus on the coefficient on utbinteract because it reflects 
the difference-in-differences change in analyst coverage between the treatment and control 
firms across the post- and pre-FIN48 periods. If H1 holds, utbinteract should have a negative, 
statistically significant coefficient.  
A DiD design requires that the assignment of observations into treatment and control 
groups is random, but FIN48 might affect such an assignment in a way that induces 
systematic imbalances in pre-FIN48 covariates between our treatment and control groups. To 
address this concern, we implement the k-to-k coarsened exact matching (CEM) approach, as 
with Blackwell et al. (2009) and Iacus et al. (2011), to match each of our treatment firms with 
a control firm to form our sample for the DiD analysis. Matching is conducted by estimating 
the regression of corporate tax avoidance on its determinants which include firm size (size), 
firm age (firmage), book-to-market ratio (btm), financial leverage (lev), pre-tax return on 
assets (roa), property, plant and equipment (ppe), intangible assets (intangible), equity 
income (equityic), and foreign income (foreignic) (e.g. Cheng et al. 2012; Hope et al. 2013; 
Gao et al. 2016; Cen et al. 2017). 537 matched pairs are identified following the k-to-k CEM 
matching.  
Panel A of Table 4 reports the L1 statistics, which are used to check the quality of the 
matching (e.g., Blackwell et al. 2009; Iacus et al. 2011). The overall L1 statistic for the 
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post-matched sample is 0.6851, which is substantially lower than that (i.e., 0.9868) for the 
pre-matched sample. Also, the L1 statistics of the majority of the covariates are significantly 
reduced after the matching. Therefore, the quality of our matching is assured.  
The DiD design is predicated on the parallel trend assumption that the outcome variable 
exhibits a similar trend for both the treatment and control groups in the pre-event period. 
Panel B of Table 4 shows that the average lanacov of the treatment group is statistically 
indifferent from that of the control group in any year of our pre-FIN48 sample period, thus 
supporting the parallel trend assumption.  
In addition, we also use UTB as an alternative measure of corporate tax avoidance to 
test H1. We first restrict our sample to span only the post-FIN48 period (i.e., 2007-2014), in 
which firms are required by FIN48 to disclose any change in tax reserves as adjustments to 
stockholders’ equity. Then we substitute utb for lretr (ddmpbtd) in Equation (2) and re-run the 
regression. The variable, utb, is defined as the natural logarithm of one plus a firm’s uncertain 
tax benefits at the end of a fiscal year. The higher the value of utb, the greater the degree of 
corporate tax avoidance. Based on H1, we expect the coefficient on utb to be negative and 
statistically significant at conventional levels.  
 
4 Empirical results 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables used in our empirical analysis. Due 
to the data requirements for constructing different tax avoidance measures for the regression 
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analyses, the number of observations differs for lretr, ddmpbtd, utb, and stdetr.4 Mean lretr 
equals 0.1177, indicating that the average long-run cash effective tax rate is 11.77%. The 
mean value of ddmpbtd is 0.0457, indicating that the residual domestic book-tax difference 
on average accounts for approximately 4.57% of firms’ total assets. The average value of 
lanacov is 2.3871, implying that each firm, on average, is followed by approximately 10 
analysts in our sample period. Table 2 reports the Spearman correlation coefficients between 
the independent variables used in our baseline regression. We check the potential 
multicollinearity issue with our regression estimations by running the variance inflation 
factor (VIF) test. Un-tabulated results show that the VIF value is less than 5 for all the 
explanatory variables except the post-FD-period indicator (fd). Further, our regression results 
hold when not including fd as a control variable. Therefore, multi-collinearity is not an issue 
in our multivariate analyses (O’Brien 2007). 
The tests of our main hypothesis H1 (i.e., that increased corporate tax avoidance is 
associated with reduced analyst coverage), using Equation (2), are presented in Tables 3 and 
4. The former table reports the results of our OLS (firm-fixed-effects) regressions, and the 
latter shows the results of our natural experiment. The OLS regression results in Columns 
(1-2) of Table 3 are as predicted. The coefficient for lretr is positive (0.4347) and statistically 
significant at the 1% level. The coefficient on ddmpbtd is also statistically significant at the 1% 
level, and has the predicted negative sign (-0.0144).5 On this basis, analyst coverage is 
 
4 stdetr is the tax-risk measure used in our additional tests (see Section 5.1 below).  
5 We re-run our regression analysis using the 5-year 2010-2014 period following the global financial crisis, 
and obtain qualitatively the same results. Specifically, the coefficient for lretr (ddmpbtd) is 0.2442 (-0.0113) 
and statistically significant at 5% (1%) level. 
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negatively associated with corporate tax avoidance; H1 is thus supported. A one-standard- 
deviation increase in lretr leads to an increase in lanacov by 0.7052, which is equivalent to 
29.54% of its sample mean and is economically significant. Un-tabulated analysis reveals 
that t-statistics of all regression coefficients would be substantially different if standard errors 
are not clustered by both firm and year; this indicates the necessity of doing the two-way 
clustering to correct for time-series and cross-sectional dependence in residuals (Petersen 
2009; Thompson 2011). 
Though the pooled OLS regression estimation yields the results consistent with H1, it 
cannot identify whether the impact of corporate tax avoidance on analyst coverage comes 
from explaining variation in analyst coverage across firms (i.e., cross-sectional variation) or 
variation in analyst coverage within firms (i.e., time-series variation). Conceptual arguments 
about how analyst coverage is related to corporate tax avoidance predict (i) that firms with a 
higher degree of tax avoidance are likely to have lower analyst coverage than firms engaging 
in less tax avoidance activities, which is a cross-sectional prediction, and (ii) that a firm 
which experiences an increase in tax avoidance activities is likely to be followed by fewer 
analysts, which pertains to a time-series prediction. A firm-fixed-effects regression, when 
applied to model (2), removes most of the cross-sectional variation in tax avoidance and 
relies primarily on the within-firm (i.e., time-series) variation in tax avoidance to test the 
relationship between analyst coverage and tax avoidance. If the negative association between 
analyst coverage and tax avoidance, as evidenced by the OLS regression results, is driven 
mainly by cross-sectional differences, then in using the firm-fixed-effects regression, we 
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expect to find no evidence of a relationship between analyst coverage and tax avoidance. In 
contrast, if within-firm variance in tax avoidance explains within-firm variance in analyst 
following, we expect to find an association between analyst following and tax avoidance 
when controlling for firm-fixed-effects in our regression model. Also, in determining whether 
time-series variation in tax avoidance explains time-series variation in analyst coverage, our 
firm-fixed-effects regression alleviates correlated-omitted-variables bias attributable to 
unobserved firm characteristics. 
When including firm-fixed effects, the coefficient on lretr (ddmpbtd), reported in 
Column (3) ((4)) of Table 3, is again statistically significant at the 1% level with the predicted 
positive (negative) sign. Our firm-fixed-effects results, taken together with the OLS results, 
are thus not only consistent with H1 but also allow us to go further in suggesting that the 
negative impact of corporate tax avoidance on analyst coverage can be explained not only by 
time-series variation in tax avoidance but also by cross-sectional variation in tax avoidance. 
In Columns (5) and (6), we further report results from a simple firm-fixed-effects regression 
model that includes either lretr, or ddmpbtd, as the independent variable. Both lretr and 
ddmpbtd on their own separately appear statistically and economically significant in 
explaining analyst coverage. 
Panel C of Table 4 reports the results of our FIN48-based quasi-natural experiment, 
which is implemented by running Equation (3). The coefficient on the key interaction term, 
utbinteract, in Column (1) is negative and statistically significant at the 5% level. This 
indicates that the treatment firms with positive UTB have lower analyst coverage than the 
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control firms which do not report any UTB, again in line with H1. FIN48 triggers an 
exogenous increase in treatment firms’ UTB disclosures. Our findings suggest that analysts 
are using the increased UTB disclosures of the treatment firms to infer tax avoidance 
activities, and as a result, reduce coverage of these firms. So the result can be taken as further 
evidence of the negative, causal impact of corporate tax avoidance on analyst following, 
again corroborative of H1. In addition, as a robustness check, we use UTB as an alternative 
proxy for tax avoidance in model (2). Column (2) reports the regression results. The 
coefficient on utb is negative (-0.0877) and is statistically significant at the 1% level, lending 
additional support for H1. Also, an increase of one standard deviation in utb leads to a 
decrease in lanacov by 0.1423, which accounts for 5.96% of its mean value and is thus 
economically significant in magnitude. 
All in all, based on our empirical analyses, we conclude that analysts are less likely to 
follow firms that engage more in corporate tax avoidance activities. One reason for the mixed 
prior evidence on the relation between corporate tax avoidance and earnings management is 
the endogeneity problem which is not satisfactorily resolved in the literature to date. 
Corporate tax avoidance and earnings management are both driven by managerial incentives, 
and hence are particularly susceptible to endogeneity. When applying a two-stage-least- 
squares regression model to address any such endogeneity, it is difficult to identify a valid 
instrumental variable which influences tax avoidance but does not have a direct impact on 
earnings management. Identification of exogenous shocks with which to conduct a natural 
experiment does not work in addressing this issue. This is because the time-series vis-à-vis 
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cross-section relations between tax avoidance and earnings management, as we argue 
previously, run in the opposite direction and thus cannot be disentangled via a natural 
experiment. Analyst coverage provides a nice setting to help shed light on this issue, since 
analysts use the time-series record of earnings information to make their forecasts. From the 
negative impact of corporate tax avoidance on analyst coverage, we draw the inference that 
tax avoidance is likely associated with earnings management in the time-series.  
 
5 Additional tests 
In this section, we explore a number of other issues relating to the impact of corporate tax 
avoidance on analyst behavior. First, we test whether our main results might be related to tax 
risk issues, and then the extent to which corporate tax avoidance affects analyst earnings 
forecast informativeness and forecast errors.  
5.1  The effect of tax risk on analyst coverage 
In this first sub-section, we investigate the impact of corporate tax risk on analyst coverage. 
Tax risk is conceptually different from tax avoidance, in that the former refers to the volatility 
of a firm’s tax positions across years while the latter refers to the level of a firm’s tax position 
in a particular year (e.g., Guenther et al. 2017; Wilde and Wilson 2018; Drake et al. 2019). As 
argued in Section 2.2, in attempting to deflect unwanted attention and scrutiny from outsiders, 
firms are unlikely to seek to avoid taxes either in consecutive years or concurrently with 
earnings management. More likely, volatile annual tax positions reflect a firm’s strategic tax 
planning. It is thus important to also explore whether tax risk affects analyst coverage. Tax 
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risk is conventionally defined as the volatility of a firm’s tax position over time (e.g. Drake et 
al. 2019). Accordingly, we measure tax risk by the volatility in income tax payments, 
calculated as the standard deviation of annual effective tax rates over the past five-year period 
(stdetr). Our tax risk (stdetr) measure should be able to capture any inter-temporal, 
non-consecutive tax avoidance strategy. We expect that firms adopting such a strategy would 
have higher tax risk, and as a result, are less likely to attract analyst following. To test this 
conjecture, we formulate the following regression model using both OLS and 
firm-fixed-effects specifications: 
, 0 1 , , ,
k
i t i t i k i i t
k
lanacov stdetr controls YearDummies   = + + + +         (4) 
We include the same set of control variables as in model (2). Table 5 presents the 
regression results. As can be seen, the coefficients on stdetr are negative and statistically 
significant in both the OLS and firm-fixed-effects regressions. This is in line with our 
prediction that analysts are less likely to follow firms that exhibit high tax risk. In Column (1) 
(Column (2)), a one-standard-deviation increase in stdetr is associated with a decrease in 
lanacov of 0.5329 (0.5133), which accounts for 22.32% (21.50%) of the sample mean of 
lanacov and is thus economically significant. 
 
5.2  The effect of corporate tax avoidance on the informativeness of analyst forecasts 
This sub-section explores whether corporate tax avoidance affects the informativeness of 
analyst earnings forecasts. We follow Frankel et al. (2006) to define analyst earnings forecast 
informativeness as the extent to which stock prices react to analyst earnings forecasts. 
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Corporate tax avoidance will impact the informativeness of analyst forecasts under two 
conditions: first, investors are able to observe corporate tax avoidance on a timely basis and 
to comprehend its adverse influence on corporate financial transparency; second, analysts are 
perceived by investors to be more capable of deciphering the implications of corporate tax 
avoidance for future earnings, thus rendering analyst forecasts more informative to investors. 
If both assumptions hold, we would expect investors to react more strongly to analyst 
earnings forecasts in the case of perceived corporate tax aggressiveness. On the other hand, if 
either assumption does not hold, corporate tax avoidance should not impact analyst forecast 
informativeness. To test this proposition, we run both OLS and firm-fixed-effects regressions 
for the following model: 
, 0 1 , , , ,( )
k
i t i t i t i k i i t
k
car lretr ddmpbtd controls YearDummies   = + + + +      (5) 
where car equals the cumulative unsigned abnormal stock returns over the three-day window 
[-1, 1] centered on the announcement date of an analyst’s last forecast of annual EPS for the 
fiscal year. If multiple analysts make EPS forecasts for the same firm, car is taken as the 
average of the abnormal returns associated with these forecasts. The market reaction to 
analyst earnings forecasts reflects investor demand for such forecasts. Hence, in line with 
prior research (e.g. Frankel et al. 2006; Arand et al. 2015), we control for a range of 
determinants of the demand for analyst forecasts: firm size (size), trading volume (tradingvol), 
firm beta (beta), return volatility (retvol), earnings volatility (stdeps), stock price (price), 
abnormal stock returns (qtrret), pre-tax return on assets (roa), financial constraints (hp), 
institutional ownership (insti), research and development expenditures (rd), intangible assets 
 29 
(intangible), book-to-market ratio (btm), post-FD-period indicator (fd), industrial regulatory 
status (regulated). All these control variables are defined in the appendix.  
Columns (1-2) ((3-4)) of Table 6 present the OLS (firm-fixed-effects) regression results 
from running Equation (5). None of the coefficients for lretr and ddmpbtd is statistically 
significant, which is inconsistent with corporate tax avoidance being associated with analyst 
forecast informativeness.  
In general, investors do not have access to private information, making it difficult for 
them to promptly observe tax avoidance activities that occur sporadically. Even if investors 
do manage to recognize tax avoidance, they may not understand its adverse impact on 
financial transparency, and thus not resort to increased analyst services. Furthermore, analysts 
might not always be able to infer the implications of tax avoidance for future earnings. All 
such factors could potentially help explain why corporate tax avoidance does not appear to be 
associated with an increase in the stock market reactions to analyst forecasts. Importantly, in 
contrast to our earlier evidence which is consistent with the supply-curve argument of our 
main hypothesis, the insignificant results for model (5) confute the alternative analyst- 
demand-curve argument which posits that corporate tax avoidance raises investor demand for 
analyst forecasts and increases analyst coverage.  
5.3  The effect of corporate tax avoidance on analyst forecast errors 
Corporate tax avoidance obfuscates financial information and makes accurate forecasting 
more difficult for analysts. As such, it is plausible that corporate tax avoidance activities 
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increase analyst forecast errors. In this sub-section, we examine whether conditional on 
analysts following a firm, corporate tax avoidance impacts analyst forecast errors. Since 
analyst compensation is tied to investor demand for analyst services, analysts have incentives 
to maintain a good reputation with investors. Due to the reputation concern, analysts often 
opt to cover a firm for which they feel confident in making accurate forecasts (Das et al. 2006; 
Franco et al. 2015), and thus may refrain from covering a tax-avoiding firm that is perceived 
as having high financial opacity. If, on the other hand, they still decide to cover such firms, 
they might be prepared to incur the necessary greater information acquisition and/or 
processing costs required to maintain forecast accuracy. 6  In such cases, corporate tax 
avoidance will not increase analyst forecast errors. To test this proposition, we run both OLS 
and firm-fixed-effects regressions for the following model: 
, 0 1 , , , ,( )
k
i t i t i t i k i i t
k
error lretr ddmpbtd controls YearDummies   = + + + +       (6) 
where error equals the absolute difference between actual EPS per I/B/E/S and an analyst’s 
last forecast of annual EPS for a firm for a fiscal year, divided by the firm’s stock price at the 
end of the fiscal year.7 If there are multiple analysts making the EPS forecasts for a firm, we 
employ the average of their last available forecasts for annual EPS. In line with prior research 
on analyst forecast errors (Lang and Lundholm 1996; Das et al. 1998; Lim 2001; Hong and 
 
6 This argument is in line with Bratten et al. (2017) who find that as corporate tax complexity increases, 
tax-expert analysts are more accurate in their forecasts relative to management forecasts.  
7 Our results remain qualitatively the same, if we use the earnings from Compustat (which are adjusted for 
transitory components of earnings) instead of from I/B/E/S to construct our analyst forecast error variable 
in our regression analysis. We also obtain similar results and inferences if we repeat our regression analysis 
by looking at positive and negative analyst forecast errors separately. A positive (negative) analyst forecast 
error is defined as the absolute difference between actual EPS and an analyst’s last forecast of annual EPS 
for a firm for a fiscal year, divided by the firm’s stock price at the end of the fiscal year, if actual EPS is 
higher (lower) than the analyst forecast of annual EPS, and 0 if actual EPS is lower (higher) than the 
analyst’s last forecast of annual EPS. 
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Kubik 2003; Ke and Yu 2006; Dhaliwal et al. 2012; Hao et al. 2017; Bhandari et al. 2018), 
we control for firm size (size), return volatility (retvol), stock price (price), abnormal stock 
returns (qtrret), pre-tax return on assets (roa), financial constraints (hp), institutional 
ownership (insti), intangible assets (intangible), book-to-market ratio (btm), analyst forecast 
horizon (horizon), abnormal trading volume (abtradvol), change in pre-tax return on assets 
(changeroa), and change in EPS (changeeps). These variables are defined in the appendix. 
Columns (1-2) ((3-4)) of Table 7 report the OLS (firm-fixed-effects) regression results. The 
coefficients on lretr (ddmpbtd) are not statistically significant. Thus, there is no evidence 
indicating that corporate tax avoidance leads to increased analyst forecast errors. On this 
basis, conditional on deciding to follow a tax-aggressive firm, analysts appear prepared to 
invest the necessary additional efforts and resources to maintain their forecast accuracy. 
 
6 Conclusion 
We extend the tax avoidance literature by investigating whether and how corporate tax 
avoidance affects analyst coverage and forecasts. Despite the extensive tax research to date, 
the informational role of corporate tax avoidance in capital markets remains an 
underexplored area. Our study fills this gap in the literature. In developing our testable 
hypothesis, we first seek to reconcile the mixed prior evidence on the relationship between 
corporate tax avoidance and earnings management. To this end, we argue that the association 
between tax avoidance and earnings management is contemporaneously negative, but that the 
lead-lag association between the two is positive, such that overall, high corporate tax 
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avoidance is associated with a high level of earnings management in the time-series. 
Moreover, tax avoidance itself makes financial information opaque (e.g. Graham and Tucker 
2006; Kim et al. 2011). Thus, corporate tax avoidance transactions obfuscate the trend record 
of financial information used by analysts for their forecasts. Given the high opacity resulting 
from tax avoidance activities, analysts have to incur high information gathering and/or 
processing costs for their earnings forecasts, and are at high risks of issuing inaccurate 
forecasts and of reputational losses; this reduces the net benefits to analysts of providing 
earnings forecasts. Therefore, we expect analysts to be less likely to cover firms with a high 
level of tax avoidance activities. Our results support this conjecture and are robust to the use 
of a firm-fixed-effects model and of a quasi-natural experiment to control for potential 
endogeneity.  
In additional analyses, we predict and show that firms implementing riskier tax-planning 
strategies tend to have lower analyst following. However, we do not find evidence that given 
an analyst’s decision to follow a tax-avoiding firm, the market reaction to her/his earnings 
forecasts increases, which is inconsistent with the “demand-curve” argument that corporate 
tax avoidance will raise demand for analyst services. We also find no evidence that 
conditional on an analyst’s decision to cover a firm engaged in tax avoidance, forecast errors 
increase as a result; this we attribute to greater analyst effort. Overall, our results add to the 
negative consequences of corporate tax avoidance: it reduces analyst following, potentially 
undermining the analysts’ overall information intermediary role in capital markets, and might 
thereby weaken market efficiency. Thus, our study should be relevant to regulators and 
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authorities, who are charged with improving the corporate taxation environments and, more 
generally, disclosure transparency in the financial marketplace. As suggested by Kuo and Lee 
(2016), regulators and tax authorities may enforce an increase in book-tax conformity to 
reduce the likelihood and extent of tax avoidance, or earnings management, by managers.  
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Appendix: Summary of variable definitions 
 
Variables Definitions 
lanacov The natural logarithm of 1 plus the number of analysts that make at least one 
annual EPS forecast for a firm over a fiscal year. lanacov equals 0 if there is no 
analyst forecasting annual EPS for a firm over a fiscal year. 
error The absolute value of the difference between actual EPS and an analyst’s last 
forecast of annual EPS for a firm for a fiscal year, divided by the firm’s stock 
price at the end of the fiscal year. If there are multiple analysts forecasting annual 
EPS for a firm for a fiscal year, the average is taken of the analysts’ last forecasts 
of annual EPS. error is winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels, respectively. 
car  Three-day [-1, 1] cumulative unsigned abnormal stock returns surrounding an 
analyst’s last forecast of EPS for a fiscal year. The abnormal stocks returns are 
calculated using market model with an estimation period of [-181, -2] relative to 
the forecast date. If there are multiple analysts forecasting EPS for a firm for a 
fiscal year, the average is taken of the cumulative unsigned abnormal stock 
returns. 
lretr Long-run cash effective tax rate based on Dyreng et al. (2008), which is computed 
as the sum of corporate income tax paid, divided by the sum of a firm’s pre-tax 
income net of special items, over the previous five years. Consistent with prior 
literature, LRETR is truncated to fall within the interval [0, 1]. 
ddmpbtd The residual domestic book-tax difference based on Desai and Dharmapala 
(2006), which equals the residuals from the following firm-fixed-effects 
regression model: mpbtdi,t=1tai,t+ui+i,t. mpbtd is domestic book-tax difference 
based on Manzon-Plesko (2002), which is calculated as: (domestic pre- tax 
income - (current federal income tax expense/statutory tax rate) - state income tax 
expense - other income tax expense - equity income)/lagged total assets. TA is 
total accruals measured using the cash flow method of Hribar and Collins (2002). 
Both MPBTD and TA are scaled by lagged total assets and winsorized at the 1% 
and 99% levels for the fixed effect regression estimation.  
stdetr The standard deviation of annual GAAP effective tax rates over the period of year 
t-4 to t.  
utb The natural logarithm of 1 plus a firm’s uncertain tax benefits at the end of a fiscal 
year. 
yutb 1 if a firm is in a three-year period (i.e., 2007-2009) after the implementation of 
FIN48 and 0 if a firm is in a three-year period (i.e., 2003-2005) before the passage 
of FIN48. 
tutb 1 if a firm discloses a positive amount of uncertain tax benefits for a fiscal year 
and 0 otherwise. 
tradingvol Dollar trading volumes over a fiscal year for a firm. 
fd 1 for the post-FD period (i.e., years of 2001-2014), and 0 for the pre-FD period 
(i.e., years of 1995-2000). 
beta Equity beta for a firm for a fiscal year. 
stdeps The standard deviation of annual EPS over the period of year t-4 to t. 
retvol The standard deviation of daily market excess returns over a fiscal year. 
price Stock price of a firm at the fiscal year end date. 
size The natural logarithm of the market value of a firm’s equity at the end of a fiscal 
year. 
btm The book value of firm equity divided by the market value of firm equity at the 
end of a fiscal year. 
insti Institutional investors’ stock ownership as a percentage of the outstanding shares 
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for a firm at the end of a fiscal year. 
rd 1 if research and development expense of a firm is positive for a fiscal year and 0 
otherwise. 
qtrret Buy-and-hold abnormal stock returns of a firm for a fiscal year. 
intangible Intangible assets divided by total assets for a firm at the end of a fiscal year. 
roa Pre-tax income net of special items and divided by total assets at the end of a 
fiscal year. 
hp A financial constraint index (hp) developed by Hadlock and Pierce (2010). 
Hp=-0.737*size+0.043*size2-0.040*age, where size is the natural logarithm of 
total assets capped at $4.5 billion, and age is the number of years a firm has been 
listed. 
regulated 1 if a firm belongs to a regulated industry (SIC 4900-4999, 6000-6411, or 6500- 
6999) and 0 otherwise. 
equityic Equity income in earnings, scaled by lagged total assets. 
foreignic Foreign income scaled by lagged total assets. 
firmage The number of months since a firm’s IPO. If the IPO date is not available in 
Compustat, the firm age variable represents the number of months since CRSP 
first reported return data for the firm. 
lev Long-term debt scaled by lagged total assets. 
ppe Property, plant, and equipment scaled by lagged total assets. 
horizon The natural log of the number of days between an analyst’s last annual EPS 
forecast date and a firm’s earnings announcement date. If there are multiple 
analysts that forecast annual EPS for a firm for a fiscal year, the average is taken 
of the number of days between analysts’ last EPS forecast dates and a firm’s 
earnings announcement date. 
abtradvol Abnormal trading volume of a firm for a fiscal year, which is computed as dollar 
trading volume over the last two fiscal quarters of a year minus dollar trading 
volume over the first two fiscal quarters. 
changeroa Return on assets of a firm for the current fiscal year minus that for the previous 
fiscal year. Return on assets is computed as pre-tax income net of special items 
and divided by total assets at the end of a fiscal year. 
changeeps Annual EPS of a firm for the current fiscal year minus that for the previous year, 
divided by stock price at the end of the previous fiscal year. 
 
 
 
 
 36 
References 
Abarbanell J, Lehavy R (2003) Biased forecasts or biased earnings? The role of reported 
earnings in explaining apparent bias and over/underreaction in analysts’ earnings 
forecasts. J Account Econ 36:105-146. 
 
Aboody D, Lev B (2000) Information asymmetry, R&D, and insider gains. J Financ 
55:2747-2766. 
 
Aggarwal R, Mishra D, Wilson C (2018) Analyst recommendations and the implied cost of 
equity. Rev Quant Finan Account 50:717-743. 
 
Ajinkya B, Bhojraj S, Sengupta P (2005) The association between outside directors, 
institutional investors and the properties of management earnings forecasts. J Account 
Res 43:343-376. 
 
Allen A, Francis BB, Wu Q, Zhao Y (2016) Analyst coverage and corporate tax 
aggressiveness. J Bank Financ 72:84-98. 
 
Arand D, Kerl A, Walter A (2015) When do sell-side analyst reports really matter? 
Shareholder protection, institutional investors and the informativeness of equity 
research. Eur Financ Manag 21:524-555. 
 
Barth ME, Hutton AP (2004) Analyst earnings forecast revisions and the pricing of accruals. 
Rev Account Stud 9:59-96. 
 
Batta GE, Qiu J, Yu F (2016) Credit derivatives and analyst behavior. Account Rev 
91:1315-1343. 
 
Bhandari A, Mammadov B, Thevenot M (2018) The impact of executive inside debt on 
sell-side financial analyst forecast characteristics. Rev Quant Finan Acc 51:283-315. 
 
Bhushan R (1989) Firm characteristics and analyst following. J Account Econ 11:255-274. 
 
Blackwell M, Iacus S, King G, Porro G (2009) CEM: Coarsened exact matching in Stata. 
Stata J 9:524-546. 
 
Bradshaw M, Baginski SS, Wahlen J (2014) Financial reporting, financial statement analysis 
and valuation. 8th edition, Cengage learning, Boston. 
 
Bradshaw MT, Richardson SA, Sloan RG (2001) Do analysts and auditors use information in 
accruals? J Account Res 39:45-74. 
 
Bratten B, Gleason CA, Larocque SA, Mills LF (2017) Forecasting taxes: New evidence 
from analysts. Account Rev 92:1-29. 
 
Brennan MJ, Hughes PJ (1991) Stock prices and the supply of information. J Financ 
46:1665-1691. 
 
Brown LD, Call AC, Clement MB, Sharp NY (2015) Inside the “black box” of sell-side 
 37 
financial analysts. J Account Res 53:1-47. 
 
Brown JL, Drake KD, Martin MA (2016) Compensation in the Post-FIN 48 period: the case 
of contracting on tax performance and uncertainty. Contemp Account Res 33:121-151. 
 
Burgstahler DC, Eames MJ (2003) Earnings management to avoid losses and earnings 
decreases: Are analysts fooled? Contemp Account Res 20:253-294. 
 
Cen L, Maydew E, Zhang L, Zuo L (2017) Customer-supplier relationships and corporate tax 
avoidance. J Financ Econ 123:377-394. 
 
Chang X, Dasgupta S, Hilary G (2006) Analyst coverage and financing decisions. J Financ 
61:3009-3048.  
 
Chen S, Chen X, Cheng Q, Shevlin T (2010) Are family firms more tax aggressive than 
non-family firms? J Financ Econ 95:41-61. 
 
Chen NX, Chiu P-C, Shevlin T (2018) Do analysts matter for corporate tax planning? 
Evidence from a natural experiment. Contemp Account Res 35:794-829. 
 
Chen X, Harford J, Li K (2007) Monitoring: Which institutions matter? J Financ Econ 
86:279-305. 
 
Chen H, Huang CT, Lin HWW (2016) Changes in analyst following for less covered firms 
accompanying Regulation Fair Disclosure: the roles of ability and industry experience. 
Rev Quant Finan Acc 46:519-541. 
 
Chen T, Lin C (2017). Does information asymmetry affect corporate tax aggressiveness? J 
Financ Quant Anal 52:2053-2081. 
 
Cheng CSA, Huang HH, Li Y, Stanfield J (2012) The effect of hedge fund activism on 
corporate tax avoidance. Account Rev 87:1493-1526. 
 
Cheng M, Subramanyam KR (2008) Analyst following and credit ratings. Contemp Account 
Res 25:1007-1043. 
 
Clement MB, Hales J, Xue Y (2011) Understanding analysts’ use of stock returns and other 
analysts’ revisions when forecasting earnings. J Account Econ 51:279-299. 
 
Cohen RB, Gompers PA, Vuolteenaho T (2002) Who underreacts to cash-flow news? 
Evidence from trading between individuals and institutions. J Financ Econ 66:409-462. 
 
Comprix J, Graham R, Moore JA (2011) Empirical evidence on the impact of book-tax 
differences on divergence of opinion among investors. J Am Tax Assoc 33 51-78. 
 
Crabtree AD, Kubick TR (2014) Corporate tax avoidance and the timeliness of annual 
earnings announcements. Rev Quant Finan Acc 42:51-67. 
 
Das S, Levine CB, Sivaramakrishnan K (1998) Earnings predictability and bias in analysts' 
 38 
earnings forecasts. Account Rev 73:277-294. 
 
Das S, Guo R-J, Zhang H (2006) Analysts’ selective coverage and subsequent performance of 
newly public firms. J Financ 61:1159-1185. 
 
Desai MA, Dharmapala D (2006) Corporate tax avoidance and high-powered incentives. J 
Financ Econ 79:145-179. 
 
Desai MA, Dharmapala D (2009) Earnings management, corporate tax shelters, and book–tax 
alignment. Natl Tax J 62:169-186. 
 
Dhaliwal DS, Radhakrishnan S, Tsang A, Yang YG (2012) Nonfinancial disclosure and 
analyst forecast accuracy: International evidence on corporate social responsibility 
disclosure. Account Rev 87:723-759. 
 
Donohoe MP, Knechel WR (2014) Does corporate tax aggressiveness influence audit pricing? 
Contemp Account Res 31:284-308. 
 
Drake KD Lusch SJ, Stekelberg J (2019) Does tax risk affect investor valuation of tax 
avoidance? J Account Audit Financ 34:151-176. 
 
Dyreng SD, Hanlon M, Maydew EL (2008) Long-run corporate tax avoidance. Account Rev 
83:61-82. 
 
Elgers PT, Lo MH, Pfeiffer Jr RJ (2003) Analysts’ vs. investors’ weightings of accruals in 
forecasting annual earnings. J Account Public Policy 22:255-280. 
 
Emery DR, Li X (2009) Are the Wall Street analyst rankings popularity contests? J Financ 
Quant Anal 44:411-437. 
 
Erickson M, Hanlon M, Maydew EL (2004) How much will firms pay for earnings that do 
not exist? Evidence of taxes paid on allegedly fraudulent earnings. Account Rev 
79:387-408. 
 
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) 2006 Accounting for Uncertainty in Income 
Taxes: An Interpretation of FASB Statement No. 109. FASB Interpretation No. 48, 
FASB, Norwalk, CT. 
 
Franco GD, Hope O-K, Larocque S (2015) Analysts’ choice of peer companies. Rev Account 
Stud 20:82-109. 
 
Frank MM, Lynch LJ, Rego SO (2009) Tax reporting aggressiveness and its relation to 
aggressive financial reporting. Account Rev 84:467-496. 
 
Frankel R, Kothari SP, Weber J (2006) Determinants of the informativeness of analyst 
research. J Account Econ 41:29-54. 
 
Gao L, Yang LL, Zhang JH (2016) Corporate patents, R&D success, and tax avoidance. Rev 
Quant Finan Acc 47:1063-1096. 
 
 39 
Gleason C, Mills L (2002) Reporting and recording of contingent tax liabilities. Account Rev 
77:317-342. 
 
Gleason CA, Mills LF, Nessa ML (2018) Does FIN 48 improve firms’ estimates of tax 
reserves? Contemp Account Res forthcoming. 
 
Goh BW, Lee J, Lim CY, Shevlin T (2016) The effect of corporate tax avoidance on the cost 
of equity. Account Rev 91:1647-1670. 
 
Gompers P, Metrick A (2001) Institutional investor and equity prices. Q J Econ 116:229-259. 
 
Gow ID, Ormazabal G, Taylor DJ (2010) Correcting for cross-sectional and time-series 
dependence in accounting research. Account Rev 85:483-512. 
 
Graham JR, Hanlon M, Shevlin T, Shroff N (2014) Incentives for tax planning and avoidance: 
Evidence from the field. Account Rev 89:991-1023. 
 
Graham JR, Tucker AL (2006) Tax shelters and corporate debt policy. J Financ Econ 
81:563-594. 
 
Gu F, Wang W (2005) Intangible assets, information complexity, and analysts’ earnings 
forecasts. J Bus Financ Account 32:1673-1702. 
 
Guenther DA, Matsunaga SR, Williams BM (2017) Is tax avoidance related to firm risk? 
Account Rev 92:115-136. 
 
Gupta S, Laux R, Lynch D (2016) Do firms use tax reserves to meet analysts’ forecasts? 
Evidence from the Pre- and Post-FIN 48 periods. Contemp Account Res 33:1044-1074. 
 
Hadlock CJ, Pierce JR (2010) New evidence on measuring financial constraints: Moving 
beyond the KZ index. Rev Financ Stud 23:1909-1940. 
 
Hanlon M (2005) The persistence and pricing of earnings, accruals, and cash flows when 
firms have large book-tax differences. Account Rev 80:137-166. 
 
Hanlon M, Heitzman S (2010) A review of tax research. J Account Econ 50:127-178. 
 
Hanlon M, Krishnan GV, Mills LF (2012) Audit fees and book-tax differences. J Am Tax 
Assoc 34:55-86. 
 
Hanlon M, Slemrod J (2009) What does tax aggressiveness signal? Evidence from stock price 
reactions to news about tax shelter involvement. J Public Econ 93:126-141. 
 
Hao M, Forgione DA, Guo L, Zhang H (2017) Improvement in clinical trial disclosures and 
analysts’ forecast accuracy: evidence from the pharmaceutical industry. Rev Quant 
Finan Acc 49:785-810. 
 
Hasan I, Hoi CK, Wu Q, Zhang H (2014) Beauty is in the eye of the beholder: The effect of 
corporate tax avoidance on the cost of bank loans. J Financ Econ 113:109-130. 
 40 
He G, Marginson D, Dai X (2019) Do voluntary disclosures of product and business 
expansion plans impact analyst coverage and forecasts? Account Bus Res. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/00014788.2018.1559717 
 
Healy PM, Hutton AP, Palepu KG (1999) Stock performance and intermediation changes 
surrounding sustained increases in disclosure. Contemp Account Res 16:485-520. 
 
Hodder L, Hopkins PE, Wood DA (2008) The effects of financial statement and informational 
complexity on analysts’ cash flow forecasts. Account Rev 83:915-956. 
 
Hong H, Kubik JD (2003) Analyzing the analysts: career concerns and biased earnings 
forecasts, J Financ 58:313-351. 
 
Hope O-K, Ma M, Thomas WB (2013) Tax avoidance and geographic earnings disclosure, J 
Account Econ 56:170-189. 
 
Hope O-K, Thomas WB, Winterbotham G (2009) Geographic earnings disclosure and trading 
volume. J Account Public Policy 28:167-188. 
 
Hribar P, Collins D (2002) Errors in estimating accruals: Implications for empirical research. 
J Account Res 40:105–134. 
 
Huddart SJ, Ke B (2007) Information asymmetry and cross-sectional variation in insider 
trading. Contemp Account Res 24:195-232. 
 
Iacus SM, King G, Porro G (2011) Causal inference without balance checking: Coarsened 
exact matching. Polit Anal 20:1-24. 
 
Irani AJ, Karamanou I (2003) Regulation Fair disclosure, analyst following, and analyst 
forecast dispersion. Account Horiz 17:15-29. 
 
Irani RM, Oesch D (2013) Monitoring and corporate disclosure: Evidence from a natural 
experiment. J Financ Econ 109:398-418. 
 
Isin AA (2018) Tax avoidance and cost of debt: The case for loan-specific risk mitigation and 
public debt financing. J Corp Financ 49:344-378. 
 
Jin C, Li T, Zheng SX (2016) IPO offering size and analyst forecasts. Rev Pac Basin Financ 
Mark Pol 19:1-25. 
 
Ke B, Yu Y (2006) The effect of issuing biased earnings forecasts on analysts’ access to 
management and survival. J Account Res 44:965-999. 
 
Kim J-B, Li Y, Zhang L (2011) Corporate tax avoidance and stock price crash risk: Firm-level 
analysis. J Financ Econ 100:639-662. 
 
Kuo NT, Lee CF (2016) A potential benefit of increasing book-tax conformity: evidence from 
the reduction in audit fees. Rev Account Stud 21:1287-1326. 
 
Lang MH, Lundholm RJ (1996) Corporate disclosure policy and analyst behavior. Account 
 41 
Rev 71:467-492.  
 
Lee C, So EC (2017) Uncovering expected returns: Information in analyst coverage proxies. J 
Financ Econ 124:331-348. 
 
Lennox C, Lisowsky P, Pittman J (2013) Tax aggressiveness and accounting fraud. J Account 
Res 51:739-778. 
 
Lev B, Nissim D (2004) Taxable income, future earnings, and equity values. Account Rev 
79:1039-1074. 
 
Li W, Pittman J, Wang Z (2018) The determinants and consequences of tax audits: Some 
evidence from China. J Am Tax Assoc. https://doi.org/10.2308/atax-52136 
 
Lim T (2001) Rationality and analysts’ forecast bias. J Financ 56:369-385.  
 
Lin MC, Ho PH, Chih HL (2018) Effects of managerial overconfidence on analyst 
recommendations. Rev Quant Finan Acc. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11156-018-0743-4 
 
Lisowsky P, Robinson L, Schmidt A (2013) Do publicly disclosed tax reserves tell us about 
privately disclosed tax shelter activity? J Account Res 51:583-629. 
 
Manzon G, Plesko G (2002) The relation between financial and tax reporting measures of 
income. Tax Law Rev 55:175-214. 
 
Marcus B, Wallace S (1991) Competing in the New Capital Markets: Investor Relations 
Strategies for the 1990s. New York, NY, Harper Business. 
 
Menichini AA (2017) On the value and determinants of the interest tax shields. Rev Quant 
Finan Acc 48:725-748. 
 
Mikhail MB, Walther BR, Willis RH (1999) Does forecast accuracy matter to security 
analysts? Account Rev 74:185-200. 
 
Mills LF (1998) Book-tax differences and Internal Revenue Service adjustments. J Account 
Res 36:343-356. 
 
Mills LF, Newberry KJ (2001) The influence of tax and nontax costs on book-tax reporting 
differences: Public and private firms. J Am Tax Assoc 23:1-19. 
 
Mohanram PS, Sunder SV (2006) How has Regulation FD affected the operations of 
financial analysts? Contemp Account Res 23:491-525. 
 
O’Brien PC, Bhushan R (1990) Analyst following and institutional ownership. J Account Res 
28:55-76. 
 
O’Brien RM (2007) A caution regarding rules of thumb for variance inflation factors. Qual 
Quant 41:673-690. 
 
Palepu K, Healy J, Bernard V (2000) Business Analysis and Valuation. Using Financial 
 42 
Statements. Cincinnati, OH, South-Western College Publishing. 
 
Peek E, Palepu KG, Healy PM (2016) Business analysis and valuation: Text and cases, 4rd 
edition, Thomson South-Western. 
 
Petersen MA (2009) Estimating standard errors in finance panel data sets: comparing 
approaches. Rev Financ Stud 22:435-480. 
 
Robinson LA, Schmidt AP (2013) Firm and investor responses to uncertain tax benefit 
disclosure requirements. J Am Tax Assoc 35:85-120. 
 
Robinson LA, Stomberg B, Towery EM (2016) One size does not fit all: How the uniform 
rules of FIN 48 affect the relevance of income tax accounting. Account Rev 
91:1195-1217. 
 
Robinson LA, Savor P, Sikes S (2017) Do investors view income tax expense as less 
value-relevant post FIN 48? Working paper, University of Pennsylvania. 
 
Roger T (2018) The coverage assignments of financial analysts. Account Bus Res 
48:651-673. 
 
Salerno D (2014) The role of earnings quality in financial analyst forecast accuracy. J Appl 
Bus Res 30:255-276. 
 
Smith CW, Watts RL (1992) The investment opportunity set and corporate financing, 
dividend, and compensation policies. J Financ Econ 32:263–292. 
 
Stickel SE (1990) Predicting individual analyst earnings forecasts. J Account Res 
28:409-417. 
 
Thompson SB (2011) Simple formulas for standard errors that cluster by both firm and time. 
J Financ Econ 99:1-10. 
 
Weber DP (2009) Do analysts and investors fully appreciate the implications of book-tax 
differences for future earnings? Contemp Account Res 26:1175-1206. 
 
Wilde JH, Wilson RJ (2018) Perspectives on corporate tax planning: observations from the 
past decade. J Am Tax Assoc 40:63-81. 
 
Wilson RJ (2009) An examination of corporate tax shelter participants. Account Rev 
84:969-999. 
 
Wooldridge JM (2016) Introductory econometrics: A modern approach, 6th edn. Cengage 
Learning, Boston. 
 
Wu JS, Zang AY (2009) What determine financial analysts’ career outcomes during mergers? 
J Account Econ 47:59-86. 
 
 43 
Yan X, Zhang Z (2009) Institutional investors and equity returns: are short-term institutions 
better informed? Rev Financ Stud 22:893-924.  
 
Yu F (2008) Analyst coverage and earnings management. J Financ Econ 88:245-271. 
  44 
Table 1  Descriptive statistics  
Variable 
No. of 
firm-years 
No. of 
unique firms 
Mean Std.dev. 25th Median 75th 
lanacov 29,372 7,285 2.3871 1.6223 0.6931 2.7081 3.6889 
car 23,563 5,993 0.0840 0.0605 0.0420 0.0671 0.1065 
error 21,040 5,328 0.1327 0.6258 0.0012 0.0042 0.0192 
        
lretr 29,372 7,285 0.1177 0.1424 0 0.0753 0.1885 
ddmpbtd 26,995 7,150 0.0457 1.4637 0.0003 0.0229 0.0675 
        
utb 1,024 456 2.9683 1.9780 1.3752 2.7652 4.3438 
stdetr 23,362 6,093 0.0791 0.0816 0.0196 0.0497 0.1148 
        
size 29,372 7,285 6.0540 2.0199 4.6563 6.0830 7.3865 
tradingvol 29,372 7,285 2.06E+07 1.13E+08 2.37E+05 1.87E+06 1.06E+07 
beta 29,372 7,285 0.8337 0.6043 0.3707 0.7792 1.2154 
retvol 29,372 7,285 0.0314 0.0208 0.0184 0.0262 0.0383 
stdeps 29,372 7,285 1.1186 102.0946 0.0100 0.0237 0.0659 
price 29,372 7,285 27.4007 383.7032 7.6800 17.7500 31.9850 
qtrret 29,372 7,285 0.0204 0.7242 -0.2987 -0.0512 0.2061 
roa 29,372 7,285 -0.0206 0.1795 -0.0012 0.0117 0.0336 
hp 29,372 7,285 -1086.26 1206.70 -1800.76 -501.32 -131.85 
insti 29,372 7,285 0.5067 0.8265 0.2255 0.5038 0.7549 
rd 29,372 7,285 0.0828 0.2756 0 0 0 
intangible 29,372 7,285 0.0395 0.1076 0 0 0.0099 
btm 29,372 7,285 0.8614 2.3669 0.3511 0.5794 0.9189 
fd 29,372 7,285 0.6781 0.4672 0 1 1 
regulated 29,372 7,285 0.2917 0.4546 0 0 1 
This table tabulates the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the hypothesis tests. The sample period 
ranges from 1995 to 2014. The number of observations used for the test of H1 is 29,372. Due to the data 
requirements in constructing different tax avoidance measures for the regression analyses, the number of 
observations differs for lretr, ddmpbtd, utb, and stdetr. All the variables are defined in the appendix.  
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Table 2  Spearman correlations 
 
Variables lretr ddmpbtd size tradingvol beta retvol stdeps price 
lretr 1 
       
ddmpbtd 0.2681*** 1 
      
size 0.1966*** 0.3231*** 1 
     
tradingvol 0.1473*** 0.2606*** 0.8960*** 1 
    
beta 0.0102* 0.0302*** 0.4100*** 0.5734*** 1 
   
retvol -0.1542*** -0.2739*** -0.4131*** -0.1670*** 0.2540*** 1 
  
stdeps -0.1773*** -0.2174*** -0.3053*** -0.2213*** 0.0129** 0.3658*** 1 
 
price 0.2473*** 0.4093*** 0.7499*** 0.5856*** 0.1377*** -0.6007*** -0.4399*** 1 
qtrret 0.0062 0.2398*** 0.2494*** 0.1376*** 0.0316*** -0.1477*** -0.0039 0.3550*** 
roa 0.2363*** 0.7512*** 0.3450*** 0.2737*** 0.0305*** -0.3203*** -0.2377*** 0.4373*** 
hp -0.1667*** -0.1433*** -0.8063*** -0.6795*** -0.2475*** 0.4531*** 0.2594*** -0.6191*** 
insti 0.2156*** 0.2199*** 0.5813*** 0.7047*** 0.4678*** -0.1262*** -0.1041*** 0.4078*** 
rd 0.2044*** -0.0074 0.1083*** 0.0760*** -0.0028 -0.0518*** -0.0075 0.1180*** 
intangible 0.1821*** -0.0314*** 0.1822*** 0.1010*** 0.0033 -0.1832*** -0.1204*** 0.1977*** 
btm 0.0004 -0.2217*** -0.4109*** -0.3822*** -0.2354*** 0.0833*** 0.1873*** -0.3810*** 
fd -0.1670*** -0.0424*** 0.0297*** 0.1476*** 0.3098*** 0.1274*** 0.0390*** -0.0735*** 
regulated -0.2071*** -0.1107*** 0.0343*** -0.0934*** -0.1825*** -0.3472*** -0.2212*** 0.1679*** 
 
(Continued) 
Variables qtrret roa hp insti rd intangible btm fd regulated 
qtrret 1 
        
roa 0.2688*** 1 
       
hp -0.1118*** -0.1445*** 1 
      
insti 0.0630*** 0.1989*** -0.4404*** 1 
     
rd 0.0154** 0.1088*** -0.0595*** 0.0220*** 1 
    
intangible 0.0351*** -0.0041 -0.2956*** 0.0295*** 0.3014*** 1 
   
btm -0.3057*** -0.2566*** 0.0043 -0.1513*** -0.1067*** 0.0032 1 
  
fd 0.0752*** -0.0557*** -0.0086 0.1767*** -0.2051*** -0.0676*** -0.0215*** 1 
 
regulated 0.0509*** -0.0716*** -0.3121*** -0.1887*** -0.1702*** 0.1322*** 0.1902*** 0.0119* 1 
These tables present the results for the Spearman correlation test. The correlation matrix involves all the 
independent variables used for the main hypothesis tests. The sample consists of 26,995 firm-year observations 
and spans the years 1995-2014. All the variables are defined in the appendix. ***, **, * represent the 1%, 5%, and 
10% statistical significance levels (two-tailed), respectively.
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Table 3  Test of H1: OLS and firm-fixed-effects regressions of corporate tax avoidance on analyst 
coverage 
 
Variables   Dependent variable = lanacov 
   OLS  Firm-fixed effects 
 
Pred. 
Sign 
 
(1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) 
lretr +  0.4347***   0.2021***  0.2877***  
  (<0.001)   (<0.001)  (<0.001)  
ddmpbtd -  
 
-0.0144***   -0.0051***  -0.0043*** 
  
 
(<0.001)   (<0.001)  (<0.001) 
size +  0.4835*** 0.4831***  0.3926*** 0.3926***   
   (<0.001) (<0.001)  (<0.001) (<0.001)   
tradingvol +  -9.35E-11* -5.63E-11  -2.09E-10** -1.82E-10**   
  (0.064) (0.164)  (0.016) (0.011)   
beta +  0.5250*** 0.5256***  0.1397*** 0.1355***    
  (<0.001) (<0.001)  (<0.001) (<0.001)   
retvol +  1.6843* 1.2715  2.3519*** 2.1935**   
   (0.055) (0.128)  (0.007) (0.012)   
stdeps -  -0.0002*** -0.0002***  -0.0002*** -0.0002***   
  (<0.001) (<0.001)  (<0.001) (<0.001)   
price -  -0.0001*** -0.0001***  7.25E-06 1.01E-05*   
  (<0.001) (<0.001)  (0.339) (0.086)   
qtrret -  -0.1813*** -0.1799***  -0.1602*** -0.1550***   
  (<0.001) (<0.001)  (<0.001) (<0.001)   
roa +  -0.1271*** -0.1040**  -0.2296*** -0.2499***   
   (0.007) (0.030)  (<0.001) (<0.001)   
hp -  -0.0001*** -0.0001***  -0.0001*** -0.0001***   
  (<0.001) (<0.001)  (<0.001) (<0.001)   
insti ?  0.0877 0.0774  0.0191 0.0178   
   (0.428) (0.449)  (0.262) (0.281)   
rd -  -0.2755*** -0.2740***  0.0655* 0.0865*    
  (<0.001) (<0.001)  (0.086) (0.050)   
intangible -  -0.0221 0.0705  0.1063 0.1334*   
   (0.708) (0.269)  (0.107) (0.058)   
btm +  -0.0002 0.0002  0.0217*** 0.0223***   
   (0.934) (0.931)  (0.006) (0.008)   
fd -  -0.7712 -0.7842  0.5020*** 0.2803***   
  (0.271) (0.281)  (<0.001) (<0.001)   
regulated ?  -0.4895*** -0.5143***      
  (<0.001) (<0.001)      
          Adjusted R2   0.5675 0.5646  0.2553 0.2513 0.1191 0.1202 
Observation
s 
  29,372 26,995  29,372 26,995 29,372 26,995 
This table reports the results for the tests of H1. Columns (1-2) ((3-6)) report the results from the OLS 
(firm-fixed-effects) regressions. The sample spans the period of 1995-2014. The dependent variable is analyst 
coverage, namely, lanacov. The treatment variable is corporate tax avoidance which are proxied by the long-run 
cash effective tax rate (lretr) and residual domestic book-tax difference (ddmpbtd). All the variables are defined in 
the appendix. Because the firm-fixed-effects regression automatically drops any independent variable that exhibits no 
within-firm variance, regulated is omitted by the firm-fixed-effects test. Year dummies are included in all the 
regressions but not reported for simplicity. The p-values in brackets are based on robust standard errors that are 
clustered by firm and year (firm) in the OLS (firm-fixed-effects) regressions. ***, **, * represent the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
statistical significance levels (two-tailed), respectively.
  47 
Table 4  Test of H1: Evidence from a quasi-natural experiment (FIN48) 
 
Panel A Diagnostic check of the quality of coarsened exact matching --- comparison of L1 statistics 
 
Variables Pre-matched L1 statistics Post-matched L1 statistics 
size 0.2879 0.0536 
firmage 0.2127 0.0368 
btm 0.0785 0.0177 
lev 0.0204 0.0486 
roa 0.1686 0.0327 
ppe 0.2167 0.0795 
intangible 0.5580 0.0418 
equityic 0.0023 0.0009 
foreignic 0.4443 0.1150 
Overall 0.9868 0.6851 
 
Panel B Diagnostic test of the parallel trend assumption --- comparison of the mean of lanacov between 
the treatment and control groups in the pre-FIN48 period (2003-2005) 
 
Year 
Mean for 
Control Group 
Mean for 
Treatment Group 
Mean 
difference 
t-stat. p-value 
2003 2.6758 2.8505 -0.1746 -0.8320 0.4064 
2004 2.6932 2.9082 -0.2149 -1.1329 0.2584 
2005 2.9019 2.9954 -0.0936 -0.5427 0.5878 
 
Panel C Regression results 
 
Variables     Dependent variable = lanacov 
    (1)   (2) 
Intercept 
  
-0.5987** 
 
-1.0108***   
(0.030) 
 
(0.001) 
yutb 
  
0.0506 
 
 
 
 
(0.516) 
 
 
tutb   0.0553   
   (0.345)   
utbinteract 
  
-0.1615** 
 
 
   
(0.040) 
 
 
utb 
  
 
 
-0.0877***    
 
 
(<0.001) 
size   0.4370***  0.5317*** 
   (<0.001)  (<0.001) 
tradingvol 
  
6.74E-10* 
 
-3.60E-10   
(0.092) 
 
(0.103) 
beta 
  
0.1338*** 
 
0.0596    
(0.001) 
 
(0.170) 
retvol   8.4343***  8.6788*** 
   (0.001)  (0.009) 
stdeps 
  
0.0137*** 
 
-0.0296**   
(<0.001) 
 
(0.021) 
price 
  
-0.0032*** 
 
-0.0026*** 
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(0.007) 
 
(<0.001) 
qtrret   -0.1828***  -0.0521 
  (<0.001)  (0.147) 
roa   -0.2891  -1.1219*** 
   (0.128)  (<0.001) 
hp   -3.72E-05  -0.0001*** 
  (0.251)  (0.003) 
insti 
  
0.6118*** 
 
0.5351***    
(<0.001) 
 
(<0.001) 
rd 
  
-0.0911* 
 
-0.0609    
(0.080) 
 
(0.225) 
intangible 
  
0.2613** 
 
-0.2208**   
(0.024) 
 
(0.024) 
btm   0.1542***  0.2000*** 
   (0.001)  (<0.001) 
regulated 
  
-0.4863 
 
-0.5782***   
(0.154) 
 
(<0.001)    
 
 
 
Adjusted R2 
  
0.5737  0.6365 
Observations 
  
1,106  1,024 
Panel A reports the L1 statistics of the covariates used in the regression that is run for coarsened exact matching. 
Panel B reports the results for the t-test of the mean differences in lanacov by year between the treatment and 
control groups for the pre-FIN48 period (i.e., 2003-2005). In Panel C, Column (1) reports the regression results 
for the difference-in-differences quasi-natural experiment design. In the natural experiment, the treatment firms 
are defined as those that disclose positive UTB in any of the three years after FIN48, and the control firms are 
those that do not undertake any uncertain tax position in both pre- and post-FIN48 periods. The sample used for 
the natural experiment covers the years of 2003-2005 before FIN48 and of 2007-2009 after FIN48. Column (2) 
reports the OLS regression results for the test of H1 using UTB as an alternative measure of corporate tax 
avoidance. The sample period covers the years 2007-2014. The industry dummies, constructed based on the 
Fama-French’s twelve industries, are included in the DiD regression; year dummies are included in both 
regressions; all these dummies are not reported for brevity. The variables are all defined in the appendix. The 
p-values in brackets are based on robust standard errors clustered by firm and year. ***, **, * represent the 1%, 
5%, and 10% statistical significance levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
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Table 5  Additional test: The impact of tax risk on analyst coverage 
 
Variables   Dependent variable = lanacov 
  (1) OLS (2) Firm-fixed-effects 
stdetr 
 
-0.3285*** -0.3164***   
(<0.001) (0.006) 
size  0.5218*** 0.3816*** 
  (<0.001) (<0.001) 
tradingvol 
 
-1.23E-10** -1.65E-10***  
(0.026) (0.007) 
beta 
 
0.5137*** 0.1260***   
(<0.001) (<0.001) 
retvol  1.3103 1.5977* 
  (0.231) (0.074) 
stdeps 
 
-0.0002*** -0.0002***   
(<0.001) (<0.001) 
price 
 
-0.0001*** 7.33E-06   
(<0.001) (0.314) 
qtrret  -0.1839*** -0.1578*** 
  (<0.001) (<0.001) 
roa  -0.3776*** -0.3265*** 
  (<0.001) (<0.001) 
hp  -1.14E-05 -9.37E-05*** 
  (0.297) (<0.001) 
insti 
 
0.0702 0.0143   
(0.467) (0.280) 
rd 
 
-0.2845*** 0.0335   
(<0.001) (0.422) 
intangible 
 
0.0395 0.1090  
(0.541) (0.126) 
btm  0.0028 0.0245** 
  (0.319) (0.015) 
fd  -0.8429 0.3882*** 
  (0.246) (<0.001) 
regulated 
  
  -0.3047***  
  (<0.001)  
      
Adjusted R2 
 
0.5783 0.2286 
Observations 
 
23,362 23,362 
This table reports the results for the tests of the impact of tax risk on analyst coverage. Column (1) ((2)) reports 
the results from the OLS (firm-fixed-effects) regressions. The sample spans the period of 1995-2014. The 
dependent variable is analyst coverage, namely, lanacov. The treatment variable is tax risk, namely, stdetr. All 
the variables are defined in the appendix. The firm-fixed-effects regression automatically drops independent 
variables that exhibit no within-firm variance, and thus regulated is omitted for the firm-fixed- effects regression 
results. Year dummies are included in both regressions but not reported for brevity. The p-values in brackets are 
based on robust standard errors that are clustered by firm and year (firm) in the OLS (firm-fixed-effects) 
regressions. ***, **, * represent the 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
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Table 6  Additional test: The impact of corporate tax avoidance on the informativeness of 
analyst earnings forecasts 
 
Variables   Dependent variable = car 
  OLS  Firm-fixed-effects 
  (1) (2)  (3)  (4) 
lretr 
 
0.0033   0.0027   
(0.237)   (0.534)  
ddmpbtd 
 
 -3.76E-05   1.12E-04  
 (0.843)   (0.348) 
size  0.0017*** -4.53E-06  -0.0016 -0.0042*** 
  (<0.001) (0.993)  (0.215) (<0.001) 
tradingvol 
 
-3.68E-06** 7.14E-08  -8.28E-06** -3.67E-06  
(0.022) (0.959)  (0.045) (0.533) 
beta 
 
-0.0035*** 0.0020  -0.0055*** 4.86E-05   
(<0.001) (0.132)  (<0.001) (0.977) 
retvol  2.4821*** 2.0208***  2.3625*** 1.7774*** 
  (<0.001) (<0.001)  (<0.001) (<0.001) 
stdeps 
 
4.30E-06** -1.23E-07***  2.10E-05 -6.49E-08  
(0.014) (<0.001)  (0.471) (0.003) 
price 
 
-2.12E-05** -3.66E-05***  -1.42E-05 -3.50E-05**  
(0.012) (<0.001)  (0.491) (0.047) 
qtrret  -0.0047*** -0.0039***  -0.0054*** -0.0034*** 
 (<0.001) (<0.001)  (<0.001) (0.002) 
roa  0.0021 0.0027  0.0001 0.0014 
  (0.644) (0.371)  (0.987) (0.740) 
hp  5.00E-06*** 4.44E-06***  -1.42E-06 -2.85E-06*** 
 (<0.001) (<0.001)  (0.194) (0.005) 
insti 
 
0.0096*** 0.0089***  0.0071*** 0.0071***   
(<0.001) (<0.001)  (0.007) (0.003) 
rd 
 
-0.0002 0.0001  -0.0016 0.0008   
(0.891) (0.948)  (0.482) (0.693) 
intangible 
 
0.0024*** 0.0012***  -0.0010 -0.0005  
(0.010) (0.006)  (0.298) (0.181) 
btm  -1.26E-05*** -4.89E-06***  2.08E-05 4.75E-04* 
  (<0.001) (0.007)  (0.945) (0.054) 
fd  0.0162*** 0.0124***  0.0072** 0.0002 
 (<0.001) (<0.001)  (0.045) (0.947) 
regulated  -0.0066*** -0.0103***    
 (<0.001) (<0.001)      
     
Adjusted R2 
 
0.4488 0.4603  0.3095 0.2696 
Observations 
 
16,783 23,563  16,783 23,563 
This table presents the results for the tests of the impact of corporate tax avoidance on the informativeness of 
analyst earnings forecasts. Columns (1-2) ((3-4)) reports the results from the OLS (firm-fixed-effects) 
regressions. The sample spans the period of 1995-2014. The dependent variable is the cumulative unsigned 
abnormal stock returns, namely, car. The treatment variable is corporate tax avoidance which are proxied by 
the long-run cash effective tax rate (lretr) and residual domestic book-tax difference (ddmpbtd). The 
firm-fixed-effects regression automatically drops any independent variable that exhibits no within-firm 
variance, and thus regulated is omitted for the firm-fixed-effects regression results. All the variables are 
defined in the appendix. Year dummies are included in all the regressions but not reported for simplicity. The 
p-values in brackets are based on robust standard errors that are clustered by firm and year (firm) in the OLS 
(firm-fixed-effects) regressions. ***, **, * represent the 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance levels 
(two-tailed), respectively. 
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Table 7  Additional test: The impact of corporate tax avoidance on analyst forecast errors 
 
Variables   Dependent variable = error 
  OLS  Firm-fixed-effects 
  (1) (2)  (3)  (4) 
lretr  -0.0424   0.0352  
 (0.189)   (0.208)  
ddmpbtd 
 
 0.0044   0.0022 
 
 (0.236)   (0.479) 
size  -0.0026 -0.0174***  -0.0446*** -0.0717*** 
  (0.641) (0.003)  (0.009) (<0.001) 
retvol 
 
3.3065*** 3.5370***  2.2022*** 3.0490*** 
 
 (<0.001) (<0.001)  (0.002) (<0.001) 
price  0.0005*** 0.0009***  0.0012*** 0.0020*** 
  (<0.001) (<0.001)  (<0.001) (<0.001) 
qtrret  -0.0139*** -0.0155***  -0.0029 -0.0035 
  (0.005) (<0.001)  (0.638) (0.424) 
roa  -0.4608*** -0.5465***  -0.3315*** -0.3620*** 
  (<0.001) (<0.001)  (<0.001) (<0.001) 
hp  -1.43E-05** -3.63E-05***  -1.56E-05 -2.40E-05** 
  (0.043) (<0.001)  (0.116) (0.024) 
insti  -0.0846*** -0.1670***  -0.0053 -0.0283* 
  (<0.001) (<0.001)  (0.630) (0.094) 
intangible  0.0296 0.0034  -0.0087 0.0045 
 
(0.307) (0.730)  (0.409) (0.315) 
btm  0.1108*** 0.1480***  0.1114*** 0.1333*** 
  (<0.001) (<0.001)  (<0.001) (<0.001) 
horizon  0.0006*** 0.0010***  0.0005*** 0.0009*** 
  (<0.001) (<0.001)  (<0.001) (<0.001) 
abtradvol 
 
1.42E-06 3.61E-05  -6.23E-06 1.83E-06 
 
 
(0.951) (0.426)  (0.524) (0.937) 
changeroa 
 
8.47E-06*** 1.05E-05***  0.0041 2.71E-05*** 
 
 (<0.001) (<0.001)  (0.329) (<0.001) 
changeeps  -0.0224*** -4.10E-06  -0.0185*** 6.59E-06*** 
 
 
(<0.001) (0.297)  (<0.001) (<0.001) 
       
Adjusted R2  0.1794 0.2055  0.2056 0.1981 
Observations 14,096 21,040  14,096 21,040 
This table presents the results for the tests of the impact of corporate tax avoidance on analyst earnings 
forecast errors. Columns (1-2) ((3-4)) reports the results from the OLS (firm-fixed-effects) regressions. The 
sample spans the period of 1995-2014. The dependent variable is analyst forecast errors, namely, error. The 
treatment variable is corporate tax avoidance which are proxied by the long-run cash effective tax rate (lretr) 
and residual domestic book-tax difference (ddmpbtd). All the variables are defined in the appendix. Year 
dummies are included in all the regressions but not reported for simplicity. The p-values in brackets are based 
on robust standard errors that are clustered by firm and year (firm) in the OLS (firm-fixed-effects) 
regressions. ***, **, * represent the 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
 
 
